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Introduction
This study describes and evaluates the Federal Open Market Committee's
performance in anticipating and recognizing seven post-World War II
cyclical turns, and relates the FOMC's policy actions to its views of
economic conditions in the vicinity of these turns. One aspect of the
controversy concerning the efficacy of countercycical monetary policy
has been the Federal Reserve's promptness or lag in recognizing the
need for action when a peak or trough in general business occurs. Two
previous studies assessing the Federal Reserve System's ability to recog-
nize business cycle turning points reached conflicting conclusions. For
the cyclical turns since the 1951 Accord, Kareken and Solow estimated
the recognition lag—the period between the turn and the Federal Re-
serve's recognition of it—to be approximately 8.5monthsat peaks and
three months at troughs.1 Brunner and Meltzer disagreed. They con-
cluded that:
"In current academic parlance, the 'inside lag' of monetary policy
appears to be extremely short. On two of the three occasions when
the economy turned toward recession, the 'recognition lag' was negative;
when the economy turned toward recovery, the 'recognition lag' was
longer, averaging 3 to 4 months." 2
1 John Kareken and Robert M. Solow, "Lags in Monetary Policy," in Stabili-
zation Policies, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1963, p. 70. The total lag of monetary
policy can conveniently be divided into an inside, an intermediate, and an
outside lag. The inside lag is usually defined as the period between the need for
action and the taking of action, and can conceptually be partitioned into a
recognition lag (the period between the need for action and its recognition) and
the decision or action lag (the period between recognition and thô taking of
action). Since the Federal Reserve has the power to act when the need is recog-
nized, Kareken and Solow assumed that the decision lag was zero or negligible
and that the inside lag was essentially a recognition lag.
The intermediate lag is defined as the period between the taking of action and
the financial effects of the action, and the outside lag as the period between the
financial impact and its effect on real production and employment. See ibid.,
pp. 3 and 62.
2 Karl Brunner and A. H. Meltzer, The Federal Reserve's Attachment to the62 Recognition Pattern of the FOMC
Both studies determined the Federal Reserve's recognition lag by
comparing the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates
of business cycle turns with dates of "policy change." 8Themaximum
amount of earning assets that member banks as a group could hold
was used by Kareken and Solow as their indicator of modification in
monetary policy; the lag in the change in trend of this policy index
behind the NBER business cycle dates was their measure of the recogni-
tion lag. Brunner and Meltzer inferred recognition by comparing the
NBER dates with a score assigned to the Federal Reserve's actions.
Using a scale ranging from +1 (decisive easing) to —1(decisive tighten-
ing), they each independently scored the FOMC's actions as given in
the "Record of Policy Actions," a section in the Federal Reserve Board's
Annual Reports. They then compared scores and arrived at a consensus
score which presumably reflected the Committee's view of current and
expected economic conditions. After comparing their scores of the
Committee's actions with the dates of cyclical turns, they concluded
that "the System's post-Accord record of recognizing and acting at turn-
ing points can only be regarded as splendid."
Since these studies were completed, the Federal Open Market Com-
mittee's minutes for 1936—60have become available, and it is now
possible to ascertain directly what the Committee thought about current
and future economic conditions for seven of the postwar turns. At-
tempting to assess the Committee's ability to recognize cyclical turns
by inference from policy changes alone can be misleading. Only if the
FOMC reversed the direction of policy solely upon anticipation or
recognition of peaks or troughs would this approach yield satisfactory
results. If the Committee changes policy for other reasons, as it did in
Free Reserve Concept, Subcommittee on Domestic Finance, House of Repre-
sentatives, 88th Congress, 2d Sess., Washington, 1964, p. 50.
8TheNBER chronology of business cycle dates provides a record of cyclical
turns that shows the month in which the peak or trough is judged to have oc-
curred. See Table 11-1 for the NBER reference cycle dates for the peaks and
troughs covered in this study.
ibid.,p.50. The "Accord" referred toisthe Treasury-Federal Reserve
Accord of 1951.
5FederalOpen Market Committee, Minutes of the Committee, 1936—60, and
Its Executive Committee, 1936—55, The National Archives, Washington, 1964.
(Hereafter referred to as Minutes.) Prior to 1947, meetings of the Committee
were so infrequent and discussions of economic conditions so sparse that an
adequate comparison between the 1937—38 turns and the postwar turns could
not be made. Consequently the study is limited to the 1947—60 period.Procedure 63
the 1947—60 period,6 the question arises as to whether such action is in
response to an expected (or recognized) turning point or for some other
purpose (i.e., "disorderly markets," balance of payments problems, etc.).
The Committee's minutes are the best source of this information. A
reading of these minutes shows that a modification of the previous find-
ings is in order. The minutes yield additional information about the
Committee's ability to recognize cyclical turns and, in combination with
its actions, yield additional insight into decisions concerning monetary
policy.
Chapter 2 describes the method used to evaluate the Committee's
forecasts. Chapter 3 reviews chronologically the FOMC's view of eco-
nomic conditions in the vicinity of the seven postwar turns covered by
its minutes and compares its ability to recognize peaks and troughs
with that of the business analysts studied by Fels. Chapter 4 relates the
Committee's forecasts and views of current economic conditions to the
policy decisions which it made during the periods surrounding cyclical




In his study of the problem of forecasting and recognizing business
cycle peaks and troughs, Fels found "there is a pattern in reports on
the business outlook in the vicinity of cyclical peaks and troughs. As
time goes by, analysts become increasingly aware of first the possibility,
then the probability, and finally the certainty of a turning point."
BBrunnerand Meltzer recorded eighty-seven changes in policy during the
years 1947—60. See their An Alternative Approach to the Monetary Mechanism,
Subcommittee on Domestic Finance, House of Representatives, 88th Congress,
2d Sess., Washington, 1964, pp. 119—124.
RendigsFels, "The Recognition Patterns of Business Analysts," the companion
piece in this volume. Fels studied the forecasts of ten publications made in the
vicinity of the eight turning points since World War U. Only eight of the publi-